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Playing Both Sides? Branded Sales, Generic Drugs,
and Antitrust Policy†
MICHAEL A. CARRIER,† MARK A. LEMLEY,† & SHAWN MILLER†
The issue of high drug prices has recently exploded into public consciousness. And while many potential
explanations have been offered, one has avoided scrutiny. Why has the growth in generic drugs not
resulted in lower drug prices?
In this Article, we explore a phenomenon we call “playing both sides”: companies that participate in
pharmaceutical markets as both brand owners and generics. We hypothesize that companies that earn
a significant amount of their revenue from patented drugs may have less incentive to aggressively
pursue a generic agenda, since patented drugs generate far more revenue than generic drugs do.
To investigate this phenomenon, we built a comprehensive database of all major pharmaceutical
companies, evaluating where their revenue comes from, how that has changed over time, and how it
relates to their behavior in court. Despite broad industry trends toward specialization, about one third
of the firms we study have opted for a mixed business model over time. Those firms behave differently
than pure generic firms. Our data shows that when companies with significant generic sales play both
sides, they behave differently than firms with a purer generic revenue stream. Dollar for dollar, the pure
generic firms in our study challenged more patents as invalid or not infringed than the mixed firms.
Further, “mixed generic” companies with growing brand sales (or a growing share of their revenue
from brand sales) are more likely to settle the patent challenges they bring; companies with growing
generic share are more likely to take those cases to judgment. And when they do go to judgment, patent
challengers with a greater generic share are more likely to win those challenges.
In short, we find evidence to support the hypothesis that generic companies that make more of their
revenue from patented drugs are less likely to pursue challenges to judgment and less likely to win when
they do. Playing both sides may reduce the incentive of generic challengers to fight as hard as possible
to win the case before them. That may be especially true of the sorts of challenges that affect not just
the patent in the instant case but might change legal doctrines that may ultimately hurt the generic
challenger’s brand business.
Our Article’s findings suggest a more nuanced antitrust analysis of mergers involving generic
companies and patent settlements in which generics delay entering the market. In challenging more
patents, settling fewer cases by agreeing to delay entry, and winning more of the cases they do bring,
pure generic companies promise to unleash the generic competition that they were intended to. In the
wide-ranging effort to lower drug prices, we must pay attention not only to whether a drug is patented
but also to who is, or is not, challenging that patent and why.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, public outrage over high drug prices coalesced around the EpiPen,
an epinephrine injector that is a critical, lifesaving technology for millions of
people with serious allergies. The EpiPen had been around for decades, the basic
technology was unpatented, and the epinephrine in the syringe cost no more than
a dollar.1 Nonetheless, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, which bought the rights to the
EpiPen in 2007, patented a change in how the injector worked and jacked up the
price for the EpiPen from $50 to over $600.2 Insurance companies stopped
reimbursing it, outraged patients and parents howled, the press wrote multiple
stories about it, and Mylan’s CEO was hauled before Congress and castigated
for an act of outrageous profiteering.3
The EpiPen story may seem like nothing new. Other companies have
radically increased drug prices in recent years, and some have been publicly
shamed for it, including the infamous “Pharma Bro” Martin Shkreli.4 But one
thing was different about the EpiPen story: Mylan is a well-known generic
pharmaceutical company, not a traditional branded (that is, patent-owning)
firm.5 In fact, Mylan’s CEO was the head of the generic pharmaceutical trade
association when she was called to account by Congress.6
Mylan is a generic pharmaceutical company offering low-price alternatives
to patented drugs. But it is also a patent owner raising prices and excluding
potential generic competitors. And it is not alone.
In this Article, we explore a phenomenon we call “playing both sides”:
companies that participate in pharmaceutical markets as owners of both brand
and generic drugs.7 We hypothesize that companies that earn a significant
1. Cynthia Koons & Robert Langreth, How Marketing Turned the EpiPen Into a Billion-Dollar Business,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 23, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0923/how-marketing-turned-the-epipen-into-a-billion-dollar-business.
2. See Anna Edney & Robert Langreth, Mylan Blasted for Raising EpiPen Prices to Get “Filthy Rich,”
BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 21, 2016, 6:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/mylancriticized-on-profits-and-pay-at-house-oversight-hearing.
3. See id.
4. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html
(explaining how Shkreli increased the price of a drug that the FDA had approved in 1953 that treats a life
threatening infection to “try[] to stay in business”). Shkreli is the drug executive famous for raising prices on his
drug and going to jail for securities fraud. Grace Donnelly, Here’s Martin Shkreli’s Jail Sentence, FORTUNE
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/03/09/martin-shkreli-jail-sentence/. He is also famous (in some
quarters) for buying the only copy of a Wu Tang Clan album for $2 million. Lake Schatz, RZA Tried to Buy
Back Once Upon a Time in Shaolin from Martin Shkreli, CONSEQUENCE OF SOUND (Mar. 30, 2018, 1:03 PM),
https://consequenceofsound.net/2018/03/rza-tried-to-buy-back-once-upon-a-time-in-shaolin-from-martinshkreli/.
5. Generic Products, MYLAN, http://www.mylan.com/en/products/our-medicines/generic-products (last
visited Jan. 24, 2020).
6. Paul J. Gough, Mylan CEO Heather Bresch To Lead Pharma Trade Group, BIZWOMEN (Feb. 23, 2016,
1:27 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/bizwomen/news/latest-news/2016/02/mylan-ceo-heather-bresch-toleadgeneric-pharma.html.
7. By “generics,” we refer to “medication[s] created to be the same as an existing approved brand-name
drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, and performance characteristics.” Generic
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amount of their revenue from patented brand drugs may have less incentive to
aggressively pursue a generic agenda, since patented drugs generate far more
revenue for firms than generic drugs do.
To investigate this phenomenon, we built a comprehensive database of all
major pharmaceutical companies, evaluating where their revenue comes from,
how that has changed over time, and how it relates to their behavior in court. We
study in detail the behavior of firms with a significant generic percentage. We
find that the phenomenon of playing both sides has been real and common, but
is actually in decline in much of the industry. Large pharmaceutical companies
are increasingly separating into one group that relies almost entirely on branded
drugs, a second group that produces mostly generic drugs, and a third group that
relies on a more diversified “mixed” model.
We find that the drug business is quite lucrative. Despite periodic claims
that brand companies face a “patent cliff” and are on the verge of losing
significant revenue, we find that in the past two decades brand revenues have
risen enormously. Among the 36 major drug companies we study—which
comprise about 80% of the U.S. industry—branded drug revenue between 1992
and 2016 rose from $35.2 billion to $292.2 billion, an increase of more than
730%. At the same time, the increase in brand and branded generic sales has not
come at the expense of generic firms. To the contrary, generic revenues are
rising even more quickly. During the same period, generic sales increased from
$2.27 billion to $47.1 billion, roughly 2000%.
In such a rising market for all, it appears that most large firms have
gravitated towards the business in which they believe they do best.8 They
specialize either in bringing lucrative new branded drugs to the market through
research and development (R&D) or forgoing much of their own R&D and
taking advantage of a generics market exploding at an even higher rate, albeit
with lower total revenue.
Despite broad industry trends toward specialization, about one third of the
15 firms we study in depth have opted for a mixed business model over time.9
Drug Facts, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts (last updated June 1, 2018). Our
study covers generics as well as brand drugs, both in the “small molecule” pharmaceutical context. We do not
specifically address biologic and follow-on biosimilar products, which face a different regulatory environment,
one that is newer and far less established. Although we do not study these large-molecule products, we note that
the high cost of development has resulted in biosimilars acting more like brands than generics and companies
producing both biologics and biosimilars, each of which supports our “both sides” hypothesis. See Pfizer Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494, 504 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (discussing how Pfizer sued Johnson & Johnson
(J&J) for exclusive contracts and rebates that had the effect of “creat[ing] anticompetitive consequences by
foreclosing competition”); Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New Antitrust Frontier, 2018
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2018) (explaining that, on average, generic drugs cost $2 million to develop while
biosimilars
cost
$200
million);
Worldwide
Biologics
Leader,
AMGEN
BIOSIMILARS,
https://www.amgenbiosimilars.com/heritage/worldwide-biologics-leader/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (claiming
that Amgen consists of “biologics experts—and now biosimilars experts”).
8. This is consistent with a broader industry trend toward specialization. See Ajay Gautam & Xiaogang
Pan, The Changing Model of Big Pharma: Impact of Key Trends, 21 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 379, 380 (2015).
9. They are Allergan, Inc., Endo Pharmaceutical Inc., Fresenius Kabi USA, Novartis-Sandoz, Pfizer, and
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA.
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And those firms behave differently than pure generic firms. Our data show that
when companies with significant generic sales play both sides, they behave
differently than firms with a purer generic revenue stream. In particular,
accounting for firm revenue, the pure generic firms in our study challenge more
patents as invalid or not infringed than the mixed firms. Further, “mixed generic”
companies with growing brand sales (or a growing share of their revenue from
brand sales) are more likely to settle the patent challenges they bring. By
contrast, companies with growing generic share are less likely to settle and more
likely to take those cases to judgment. And when they do go to judgment, patent
challengers with a greater generic share are more likely to win those challenges
while companies with higher brand sales are less likely to win.
In short, we find evidence to support the hypothesis that generic companies
that make more of their sales from patented drugs are less likely to pursue
challenges to judgment and less likely to win when they do. Playing both sides
may reduce the incentive of generic challengers to fight as hard as possible to
win the case before them. That may be especially true for the sorts of challenges
that affect not just the patent in the instant case but might change legal doctrines
that could ultimately hurt the generic challenger’s brand business.
Our findings have implications for how the law should respond to market
structure. One of the most critical antitrust issues in the past generation involves
settlements by which brand firms pay generics to delay entering the market. How
“pure” a generic company is could affect how the settlement is evaluated. And
our findings could have an even more direct effect on how to assess mergers in
the pharmaceutical industry, suggesting the application of heightened scrutiny
and more robust remedies for transactions that could result in pure generics
losing their incentive to challenge and litigate patents that might wrongfully be
blocking competition. Our findings on true generic competition could play a
role, until now unappreciated, in lowering drug prices. And they have broader
implications for the adversary system. While playing both sides may help parties
come to terms in a settlement or business deal, robust and opposing interests
seem to produce different (and in our view better) results in court.
In Part I, we explain the role of generic competition in the pharmaceutical
market. In Part II, we describe our data and methodology. In Part III, we present
our results on the state of branded and generic sales and how a company’s
generic share affects its behavior. In Part IV, we consider some implications of
our findings for antitrust policy.
I. NOT YOUR PARENTS’ GENERICS
Brand and generic drugs each play a vital role in the pharmaceutical
industry. A brand-name drug often results from lengthy research and
development and is protected by patents and U.S. Food and Drug Administration
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(FDA) exclusivity periods.10 Those patents are quite valuable. Indeed, Jim
Bessen and Mike Meurer find that most of the value of patents worldwide is
concentrated in the pharmaceutical industry (and indeed within a few companies
in that industry).11 These periods of protection, however, are not intended to last
forever. Generic competition is crucial in lowering prices and making drugs
more affordable.
A. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND GENERIC DRUGS12
Widespread generic entry can be traced to the Hatch-Waxman Act, which
Congress enacted in 1984 to foster innovation and competition. Generic drugs
have the same active ingredients as brand drugs. At the time of the Act’s passage,
however, generic firms needed to undertake lengthy, expensive trials to
demonstrate safety and effectiveness. Approval by the FDA took years, and
because the required tests constituted infringement, generics could not even
begin the process during the patent term. At the time Congress enacted the Act,
there was no generic on the market for 150 brand-name drugs whose patents had
already expired.13
The Act’s drafters lamented “the practical extension of the [patentee’s]
monopoly position . . . beyond the expiration of the patent.”14 As a result, they
sought to make available “low-cost, generic drugs for millions of Americans.”15
Generic competition would save the federal and state governments millions of
dollars each year. And competition would “do more to contain the cost of elderly
care than perhaps anything else this Congress has passed.”16
Congress employed several mechanisms in the Act to promote generic
competition. First, it allowed generic firms to experiment on drugs during their
patent terms in order to generate data needed for regulatory approval. Second, it
created a new process for generics to obtain FDA approval, recognizing a new
type of drug application, called an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).
ANDAs allow generics to rely on brand firms’ safety and efficacy studies,
dispensing with the need for generics to conduct their own lengthy and
expensive studies. Finally, to provide generics with an incentive to bring ANDA
challenges, the Act granted 180 days of marketing exclusivity to the first generic
to challenge the validity of a brand firm’s patent or claim that the generic did
10. FDA exclusivities include the “30-month stay” a brand can obtain in litigation,
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2018); the 4- or 5-year period for companies offering drugs with new active
ingredients, id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii); and the 3-year period for new clinical investigations, id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(iii).
11. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 109 (2008) (finding that 2/3 of the value of
worldwide patents is provided in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries and that 1/2 is captured by a small
number of large drug companies).
12. Discussion in the next two Subparts is adapted from Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100
IOWA L. REV. 7, 11–12 (2014) and Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and
at-Last Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 311–12 (2016).
13. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
14. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688.
15. 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
16. Id.
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not infringe the patent. This period is valuable to generic challengers, which
make more than half of their money during that time.17
B. GENERIC COMPETITION UNDER HATCH-WAXMAN
The Hatch-Waxman Act was successful in increasing generic entry, with
generic penetration rising from 19% of all prescriptions in 198418 to 89% in
2016.19 For the most popular drugs with expired patents, the share facing generic
competition burgeoned from 35% in 1983 to almost 100% today.20
Generic entry is a pivotal event in a drug’s lifecycle. When generics enter
the market, prices can fall dramatically. The first generic entrant typically prices
its product 5% to 25% lower than the brand drug.21 The presence of a second
generic lowers the price to approximately half the brand price.22 In markets in
which six or more generics enter, the price falls to a quarter of the brand price.23
One survey showed that patients could save 52% in the daily costs of their
medications by purchasing generic drugs.24 In fact, even though generics make
up 89% of prescriptions, they amount to only 26% of drug costs.25
In addition, generic drugs quickly take sales from brand drugs. Once a
generic enters the market, the brand product on average loses 90% of its market
share within the first year.26 Generic entry is most likely for drugs with large

17. Daniel F. Coughlin & Rochelle A. Dede, Hatch-Waxman Game-Playing from a Generic Manufacturer
Perspective: From Ticlid® to Pravachol®, Apotex Has Difficulty Telling Who’s on First, 25 BIOTECH. L. REP.
525, 525–26 (2006). Generic companies can forfeit that exclusivity in certain circumstances. See 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) (2018); SHASHANK UPADHYE, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND FDA
LAW § 29:1 (2018–2019 ed.).
18. See Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: A Review of the
FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Health Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 137 (2002) (statement of Gregory J. Glover,
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America).
19. ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS., GENERIC DRUG ACCESS & SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 16 (2017),
https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/2017-AAM-Access-Savings-Report-2017-web2.pdf.
20. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES
AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 37 (1998), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105thcongress-1997-1998/reports/pharm.pdf.
21. Id. at xiii; Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Aboutfda/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm
(last updated Nov. 20, 2017).
22. Generic Competition and Drug Prices, supra note 21.
23. Id.
24. Savings from Generic Drugs Purchased at Retail Pharmacies, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resources-you-drugs/savings-generic-drugs-purchased-retail-pharmacies
(last
updated May 6, 2016).
25. ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS., supra note 19, at 16.
26. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS
8 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offscost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
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markets, particularly those with blockbuster products, but occurs with respect to
drugs in markets of many sizes.27
The generic industry of the 1980s and 1990s was far different than it is
now. Today, the industry consists not only of companies that obtain most of their
revenue from generic drugs, but also those that sell primarily brand-name drugs
and some generics, as well as those pursuing a mixed model selling both brands
and generics. Further, many brand-name companies have launched their own
“authorized generic” versions of their own drugs.28
It is reasonable to question whether these hybrid companies serve the
function that generics were designed to, challenging patents and introducing real
competition into the market. We might worry that generic companies that make
most of their money from their brand business will behave differently. They
might, for instance, be less aggressive in challenging drug patents, particularly
avoiding challenges that might benefit them in a particular case but risk bringing
down a host of patents, including ones they own. For instance, companies that
obtain follow-on “enantiomer” patents that cover standard modifications to
drugs may be reluctant to challenge the whole idea of enantiomer patents.29 An
example of such behavior is provided by biotechnology companies that litigated
gene patents for decades without challenging the general concept of gene
patents. The reason was clear: even a company that could have benefitted as a
defendant in a particular case was not interested in taking down the whole edifice
of DNA patents. It was not until industry outsiders (doctors and patients) brought
a challenge that the courts ever confronted the question of whether human DNA
was patentable at all.30
II. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We set out to test whether hybrid firms in fact behave differently. To do
that, we first determine which firms are hybrid firms and how they are changing.
Thus, we begin by investigating trends in pharmaceutical sales, broken down by
generic and brand sales. We do so utilizing quarterly firm-level pharmaceutical
sales data we obtained from IQVIA, formerly QuintilesIMS.31 We obtained data

27. E.g., Fiona M. Scott Morton, Barriers to Entry, Brand Advertising, and Generic Entry in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, 18 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1085, 1102 (2000); Atanu Saha et al., Generic Competition
in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 13 INT’L J. ECON. BUSINESS 15, 27 (2006).
28. E.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM
IMPACT 11 (2011) [hereinafter FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS].
29. For a discussion of the problems with enantiomer patents, see Mark A. Lemley, Expecting the
Unexpected, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369 (2017).
30. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
31. IQVIA, https://www.iqvia.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2020). IQVIA refers to the sales data it provided
as National Sales Perspectives data. During March 2019 email and telephone conversations with us, IQVIA’s
representative explained: “National Sales Perspectives data are sourced from over 90 percent of wholesaler,
distributor or manufacturer direct sales to the purchasing outlet (pharmacy, hospital, clinic, etc.) and projected
to a national total. Dollar values are calculated based on the average invoice price on the ship-to
transaction. Because of where and how the data is collected, the average invoice price will vary based on the
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for 36 firms that include the top 25 in terms of total drug sales in the first quarter
of 2017 and the top 18 in terms of generic sales in the same quarter.32 For each
of the firms in our analysis, IQVIA provided total quarterly sales from the first
quarter of 1992 through the second quarter of 2017. IQVIA also provided
quarterly brand sales, generic sales, and branded generics sales for the same
period.
IQVIA defines “brand” drugs as those sold by the molecule originator and
patent holder, traded under a brand name.33 This designation remains within
their sales database after loss of exclusivity. IQVIA defines “generic”
pharmaceuticals as products traded under the molecule name and sold by a firm
other than the molecule originator.34 Finally, it defines “branded generic”
products as those not sold by the molecule originator but sold, not under the
generic signifier, but under a different brand name created by the generic
manufacturer.35
IQVIA’s sales database is forward-looking in that sales in earlier years by
firms acquired by existing firms are assigned to the existing firm. As an example,
because Endo Pharmaceutical acquired Par Pharmaceutical in 2015, Par’s sales
are added to Endo’s sales. While aggregation of acquired firms’ sales into
existing firms’ sales limits some uses of IQVIA’s data, it is valuable for our
purposes because it reveals a complete picture of sales by families of companies
over time and allows us to investigate the impact of mergers on different types
of drug sales.
From the quarterly data provided, we generate two measures of generic
share each quarter for each firm. The first is pure generic share, which we define
as the fraction of total sales attributable to pure generic sales and excluding
branded generic sales. Second, we employ “total generic” to indicate the fraction
of total sales attributable to pure generic or branded generic sales—essentially
anything but brand sales. Given that branded generics do not include products
sold by the molecule originator, we consider total generic a more complete
measure of generic sales and utilize it for most of our analysis.
In the second half of our analysis, we take a closer look at the impact of
generic share and changes in generic share over time on how aggressive firms
are in seeking to enter a market with existing brand products. For our
investigation of the impact of generic share on ANDA lawsuits where the firm
individual transaction and contractual relationship with the buyer. Post-shipment financial adjustments, such as
rebates, are not reflected in the average invoice price.”
32. IQVIA’s definitions of “brand,” “generic,” and “branded generic” drugs were explained to us via
March 2019 email and telephone conversations with the IQVIA representative who provided us with the sales
data. Six of the firms we study are on both lists: Allergan, Inc., Endo Pharmaceutical Inc., Mylan Laboratories,
Inc., Novartis-Sandoz, Pfizer, and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA. We did not obtain sufficient data from IQVIA
on Sun Pharmaceuticals sales to include it in our analysis. Sun is not among the top 25 in terms of total sales but
was 14th among the top 18 generics firms in 2017.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. “Branded generic” products cover both molecules recently protected by patents and those that have
long been under common use.
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is an alleged infringer, we collected litigation data from Lex Machina, a database
that collects all filings in every patent case filed since 2000.36 Lex Machina also
identifies and categorizes ANDA “Paragraph IV” litigation, which occurs when
a brand company sues a generic that has certified that the brand’s patent is either
invalid or not infringed.37 And it reports the outcome of each case, including
whether it settled and, if it went to judgment, who won and on what grounds.
In collecting litigation data for the 36 firms in our study, we discovered
that only 15 of the firms were alleged infringers in more than a few ANDA
lawsuits. Accordingly, we limit the second half of the analysis to these firms that
have regularly filed ANDAs. These firms include all but 2 of the firms in the top
18 in generic sales in 2017.38
Within IQVIA’s sales database over time, acquired companies are dropped
from the list of firms and those pre-acquisition sales are added to those of the
acquiring firm. Accordingly, for each of the 15 litigious firms we study, we
determined all of the drug companies acquired between 2000 and the present.39
We then confirmed that IQVIA imputed these acquired entities’ sales to one of
the 15 firms by reference to a comprehensive list of firms currently present in
their database. Finally, we created quarterly litigation time series for each of the
15 IQVIA firms that combine the lawsuits of acquired drug companies with
those of the surviving acquirer. The names of the acquired firms added to each
of the 15 IQVIA firms we study are listed in Appendix Table A.2.
III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. INCREASED BRAND AND GENERIC SALES
Both branded and generic firms often lament their fates in the market, with
brand owners complaining about a “patent cliff.”40 With the exception of the last
two years in our study, however, we find little supporting evidence. To the
contrary, over the past 25 years, the pharmaceutical industry as a whole (both
branded and generic) has been doing quite well. Between 1992 and 2016,41 as
Figure 1 shows, the 36 firms we studied witnessed a nine-fold increase in total
drug sales. In 1992, they sold $10.3 billion per quarter; 25 years later, that figure
36. LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/patent-litigation/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2018).
38. While we possess sales data for Mallinckrodt and Prasco Labs, these two firms were alleged infringers
in only 3 and 0 ANDA lawsuits, respectively, during the last ten years. Prasco only makes authorized generics.
We were unable to obtain sales data for one—and only one—of the top 18 firms in terms of generic sales, Sun
Pharmaceuticals.
39. 2000 is the earliest year of patent litigation available in Lex Machina.
40. See ANNA SON, IBISWORLD, M&A FOCUS: BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 (2013), https://perma.cc/8GNB-P6K7;
see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FROM VISION TO DECISION: PHARMA 2020, at 6 (2012) (estimating that
generics will eliminate $148 billion in pharmaceutical profits from 2012 to 2018); Mari Serebrov, PharmaFocus:
Facing
Patent
Cliff,
Pharma
Clings
to
Blockbusters,
BIOWORLD,
http://www.bioworld.com/content/pharmafocus-facing-patent-cliff-pharma-clings-blockbusters (last visited
Jan. 24, 2020).
41. 2016 is the last full year of data we possess, but we also utilize data for the first two quarters of 2017.
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had skyrocketed to $92.7 billion per quarter. By contrast, from 1992 to 2016,
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) only tripled (from $6.5 to $18.7 trillion)
and inflation grew only 82%.42 In other words, total drug sales grew three times
as fast as the entire economy. Nor is this an artifact of our focus on only the top
firms as of 2016. IQVIA reported to us its estimates of $50 billion in total U.S.
pharmaceutical sales in 1992 and $445 billion in 2016.43 As a result, our 36
firms, including all companies they acquired over the period of our study,
accounted for a very large and surprisingly stable share of the American
pharmaceuticals market—more than 82% in 1992, and 83% in 2016. Thus,
during a period of significant industry consolidation, pharmaceutical sales have
increased rapidly.
FIGURE 1. TOTAL QUARTERLY PHARMACEUTICAL SALES – ALL 36 FIRMS
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*NOTE: “TOTAL” COMBINED QUARTERLY SALES FOR THE 36 FIRMS LISTED IN APPENDIX TABLE A.1. FROM IQVIA
NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES.

42. National Income and Product Accounts: Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=19&step=3&isuri=1&select_all_years=1&nipa_table
_list=5&series=a&first_year=2016&scale=-6&last_year=2018&categories=survey&thetable=x (last updated
Dec. 20, 2019). In recent years, overall health care costs have increased even faster than the cost of prescription
drugs—4.4% versus 3.3% from 2017 to 2018. Erik Sherman, U.S. Health Care Costs Skyrocketed to $3.65
Trillion in 2018, FORTUNE (Feb. 21, 2019), http://fortune.com/2019/02/21/us-health-care-costs2/?fbclid=IwAR3QHA6u-FO3ph1TTkh5T_6YdL5IQNgs
PPT46jyVq87Hl5GMkgpa96GfXVY.
43. See supra notes 31–32. For a public explanation of the 2016 total, see U.S. Drug 2016 Sales, at $450
Billion, Moderate to Single-Digit Growth, PHARM. COMMERCE (last updated May 16, 2017),
https://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/latest-news/us-drug-2016-sales-450-billion-moderate-single-digitgrowth/.
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The data in Figure 1 do not distinguish between branded and generic
revenue. It is possible that branded sales are driving the increase. It is also
possible that all or most of the major firms—including many generic firms—are
thriving but doing so by continuously relying on brand sales to subsidize their
generic products. In fact, however, we see strong evidence against the story of a
struggling pharmaceutical business in Figure 2, which charts quarterly trends in
sales broken into the three components of generic, branded generic, and brand
sales.
Figure 2 reveals that the huge increase in drug sales among the 36 firms
over the 25-year period of our study is not solely attributable to either brand or
generic sales.44 In fact, from 1992 through 2016, generic sales increased by a
greater percentage than either brand sales or branded generic sales. Both branded
sales and branded generic sales increased approximately 830% from 1992 to
2016, with branded sales rising from $35.2 to $292.2 billion and branded generic
sales increasing from $3.8 to $31.4 billion. The firms in our study made a total
of $2.27 billion in pure generic sales in 1992 and a total of $47.1 billion in
2016—more than a twenty-fold increase! Combined with the fact that generic
drugs are generally cheaper, implying a higher volume per dollar of sales, these
trends seem to reveal a rapidly growing generic drug market alongside a thriving
brand market.

44. The reduction of brand revenues in 2011 and 2012 could be explained by the “patent cliff” that saw the
expiration of patents on (among others) Pfizer’s cholesterol treatment Lipitor, Sanofi-Aventis’s blood thinners
Lovenox and Plavix, Eli Lilly’s antipsychotic Zyprexa, and Takeda’s diabetes-treating Actos. E.g., Elisabeth
Fischer, The Patent Cliff: Rise of the Generics, PHARMA. TECH. (Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.pharmaceuticaltechnology.com/features/featurethe-patent-cliff-rise-of-the-generics/; Charlotte Harrison, The Patent Cliff
Steepens, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 12, 12 (2011), https://www.nature.com/articles/nrd3356. But it
is notable that it appears to be only a minor blip in the overall trend towards greater branded sales.
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FIGURE 2. QUARTERLY GENERIC, BRANDED GENERIC AND BRAND SALES—
ALL 36 FIRMS
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*NOTE: COMBINED QUARTERLY “GENERIC,” “BRANDED GENERIC” AND “BRAND” SALES FOR THE 36 FIRMS LISTED IN
APPENDIX TABLE A.1. FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES.

Figure 3 further shows that pure generic sales have not been crowded out
of the market by so called “branded generics”—generic products equivalent to
a branded drug that are approved by the FDA and marketed as branded drugs by
a third party.45 From the early 1990s until roughly 2005, branded generics and
generics sales increased at almost identical rates. Then, from 2005 through 2015,
pure generic sales actually grew at a much higher rate than branded generics.
Thus, for nearly 25 years, generic sales at least kept pace with branded generics.

45. FED.TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERICS: AN INTERIM REPORT 1 (2009). In a comprehensive
report, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that authorized generics were marketed during the 1990s but
were “reportedly . . . not very profitable,” which led to brands “abandon[ing] the practice by the end of the
decade.” FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 28, at 12. By 2003, however, because of the increased
use of 180-day exclusivity periods (after courts eliminated the requirement that generics “successfully defend”
litigation), they returned. Id. at 12 n.4.
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FIGURE 3. GENERIC AND BRANDED GENERICS SALES—ALL 36 FIRMS
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*NOTE: COMBINED QUARTERLY “GENERIC” AND “BRANDED GENERIC” SALES FOR THE 36 FIRMS LISTED IN APPENDIX
TABLE A.1. FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES.

Nevertheless, after peaking in 2015, pure generic revenue has declined
sharply. Pure generic revenue averaged $12.5 billion per quarter in 2015, but by
the first half of 2017 had declined to $10.7 billion per quarter. This represents a
15% decline in generic revenue over a year and a half. Comparing the same
periods, branded generics held relatively steady and declined less than 1%, from
about $7.36 to $7.30 billion per quarter. Brand revenue continued to rise as it
has since 2013, increasing from an average of $67.7 billion per quarter in 2015
to $74.7 billion per quarter during the first half of 2017—a 10% increase over
the same year and a half.46
Much of the remainder of our analysis supports the beneficial effects of a
vibrant generics market on competition. For that reason, if generic sales remain
stagnant or in decline, it will have important implications for drug competition.
It remains to be seen whether the drop in generic revenue is short-term or longterm.47
46. Austin Frakt finds that much of the increase in overall spending on drugs in the United States is
attributable to the higher prices on brand (as opposed to generic) drugs. Austin Frakt, Why Are Drug Costs So
High? Problem Traces to 1990s, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2018, at B4. Frakt adds that increased spending on brand
drugs during the 1990s was driven by a record number of new drugs aimed at treating hypertension and cancer.
Id. And Frakt points to other factors like increased advertising, faster FDA approvals, and expansion of public
programs. Id. For a discussion of reimbursement rules and how they contribute to those price differentials, see
Mark A. Lemley et al., The Medicare Innovation Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
47. One possible explanation, ironically enough, is the decline in the number of branded drugs going off
patent. Generic firms make much of their money during the 180-day exclusivity period, so fewer patented drugs
means fewer drugs going off patent and therefore fewer revenue-rich 180-day exclusivity periods. Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 144 (2013) (“[T]he ‘vast majority of potential profits for a generic drug
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B. INCREASED SEGMENTATION: GENERAL
Across the 36 firms in our study, we find that generic sales have grown
about twice as fast as brand sales. However, because brand sales in the early
1990s were 15 times higher than generic sales ($8.8 billion versus $0.57 billion
per quarter in 1992), brand sales remain about 80% of all sales. How these facts
relate to competition depends on how these sales are spread out over the firms
in the industry and how the generic share of sales for these firms has changed
over time.48
For example, because branded products sell at a much higher price than
generics, is it the case that a subset of the industry selling exclusively branded
drugs is driving these results? To analyze this, we determined the extent to which
companies rely on brand versus generic drugs. We found that over the course of
the 25 years of our study, the industry has separated into three discrete
categories: (1) “pure” generic firms, (2) primarily brand firms, and (3) “mixed”
firms.
Table A.1 in the Appendix lists the names, earliest available total generic
share, and final Q2 2017 total generic share for each of the 36 firms in the study.
We consider the 11 firms with final total generic shares ranging from 95 to
100%, as pure generic firms; the 16 firms with final total generic shares ranging
from 0 to 9.5%, as primarily brand; and the 9 firms with final total generic shares
ranging from 19 to 90%, as mixed.
We found that most of the largest firms in our study focus on brand sales
or have moved in that direction throughout the study. In fact, every one of the
16 primarily brand firms is one of the “Top 25” in total sales. As a group, Figure
4 shows that brand sales rose for the 16 primarily brand firms from roughly $5
billion per quarter in 1992 to $60 billion per quarter in 2017.49 These 16
companies earned $61.8 billion from brand drugs and $242 million from generic
drugs, for a 0.4% “pure” generic share of sales.
Figure 4 also tracks the change in total generic share for the primarily brand
firms, which again we define as the fraction of total sales derived from both pure
and branded generic products. These 16 firms have never derived more than
about 7% of their sales revenue from generic products, and since 2012 their
generic share has been declining—to a mere 2.7% in 2017. Thus, the 16
primarily brand firms, which all were among the Top 25 in 2017 sales, have been
and continue to be overwhelmingly dominated by brand sales.

manufacturer materialize during the 180-day exclusivity period.’” (citing Brief for Petitioner at 6, Actavis, 570
U.S. 136 (No. 12-416)); see also Ari Altstedter, Pharma Heir Seeks a New Holy Grail as Generic Drugs Run
Dry, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-17/pharma-heir-seeks-a-new-holygrail-as-generic-drugs-run-dry (last updated May 18, 2017).
48. The relationship between sales and competition in the drug industry also crucially depends on the
various prices that the firms we study have charged for particular drugs over time and the quantities sold.
Unfortunately, IQVIA cannot share the pricing data it possesses due to contractual restrictions with the drug
companies that provide it with the data.
49. 2017 sales are measured based on the first two quarters of that year.
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FIGURE 4. QUARTERLY BRAND, TOTAL GENERIC AND SHARE TOTAL GENERIC
SALES—16 PRIMARILY BRAND FIRMS
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*NOTE: QUARTERLY “BRAND” SALES FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES. “TOTAL GENERIC SALES” (AND
“TOTAL GENERIC SHARE”) FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES AND EQUAL TO SALES (AND SHARE) NOT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES (AND SHARE) ACCORDING TO IQVIA’S DEFINITIONS. ALL CALCULATED BY
COMBINING THE SALES OF THE 16 “BRAND” FIRMS LISTED IN APPENDIX TABLE A.1.

While many of the largest drug companies in terms of total sales remained
highly invested in brand drugs, the 11 firms in our study that were primarily
generic in 2017 became even more generic over time, as Figure 5 shows.
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FIGURE 5. QUARTERLY BRAND, TOTAL GENERIC AND SHARE TOTAL GENERIC
SALE—11 PURE GENERICS FIRMS
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*NOTE: QUARTERLY “BRAND” SALES FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES. “TOTAL GENERIC SALES” (AND
“TOTAL GENERIC SHARE”) FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES AND EQUAL TO SALES (AND SHARE) NOT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES (AND SHARE) ACCORDING TO IQVIA’S DEFINITIONS. ALL CALCULATED BY
COMBINING THE SALES OF THE 11 “GENERIC” FIRMS LISTED IN APPENDIX TABLE A.1.

From 2002 to 2015, generic sales for these top generic companies
skyrocketed from roughly $800 million to $6 billion in sales per quarter. During
that period, the amount of these companies’ brand sales fell from roughly $1.2
billion to $164 million per quarter. As a result, the contribution of generic drugs
to these firms’ sales increased from roughly 30% to nearly 100%.
Not all firms have shifted towards a pure generics or pure brand business
model. Nine of the 36 firms have maintained a mixed model and 8 of these 9 are
among the Top 25 in total sales.50 Combined, in Figure 6 we see that these mixed
firms fluctuated between 20 and 25% total generic share from the early 1990s
through 2004. Then, from 2004 to 2015, their total generic share increased to
nearly 50% due to stagnant or declining brand sales, while generic sales
continued to climb. Like both the “pure” generic firms and “pure” brand firms
described above, generic sales for these firms declined sharply from a peak in
2015 through the first half of 2017. Thus, as a group, these 9 mixed firms saw
their generic share decline to 43%. Despite this setback, it is clear that unlike the
other two broad categories of firms, these companies have maintained sizeable

50. All the mixed firms listed in Appendix Table A.1. except Fresenius Kabi are in the top 25 in total drug
sales.
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shares of both brand and generics sales over the past 25 years, rather than shifting
their business (nearly) exclusively to one or the other.
FIGURE 6. QUARTERLY BRAND, TOTAL GENERIC AND SHARE TOTAL GENERIC
SALES—9 MIXED FIRMS
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*NOTE: QUARTERLY “BRAND” SALES FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES. “TOTAL GENERIC SALES” (AND
“TOTAL GENERIC SHARE”) FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES AND EQUAL TO SALES (AND SHARE) NOT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES (AND SHARE) ACCORDING TO IQVIA’S DEFINITIONS. ALL CALCULATED BY
COMBINING THE SALES OF THE 9 “MIXED” FIRMS LISTED IN APPENDIX TABLE A.1.

In short, the industry is separating into different categories, with one set
specializing in brand products, a second focusing on generic drugs, and a third
following more of a mixed business model.51
C. INCREASED SEGMENTATION: SPECIFIC FIRM CHANGES
We see the same separation when we focus on individual firms. As Figure
7 shows, some large firms that initially had a sizeable generics business but still
more of a brand focus, such as Merck, Astellas, AstraZeneca, and Sanofi,
became exclusively focused on brand-name drugs.

51. Cf. Andrew D. Goldsmith & Francisco E. Varela, Fragmentation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry,
22 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 433, 433 (2016) (finding an increased trend in fragmentation of the
biopharmaceutical industry).
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FIGURE 7. TOTAL GENERIC SHARE OVER TIME FOR SELECT PURE BRAND FIRMS
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*NOTE: “TOTAL GENERIC SHARE” FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES AND EQUAL TO SHARE OF ALL SALES
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES ACCORDING TO IQVIA’S DEFINITIONS.

At the same time that some firms were becoming more exclusively “brandlike” in nature, other firms were becoming more mixed. As Figure 8 shows,
Pfizer and Valeant, for example, became more generic, increasing their total
generic share from about 10% in 1992 to about 20% and 50% (respectively) in
2015. Meanwhile, Teva became more brand-focused, with its total generic share
decreasing from 90% in 1992 to about 75% in 2015.
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FIGURE 8. TOTAL GENERIC SHARE OVER TIME FOR SELECT MIXED FIRMS
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Further, as shown in Figure 9, a few firms, including Novartis-Sandoz and
Allergan, remained mixed throughout the 25 years of our study.
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FIGURE 9. TOTAL GENERIC SHARE OVER TIME FOR SELECT MIXED FIRMS
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*NOTE: “TOTAL GENERIC SHARE” FROM IQVIA NATIONAL SALES PERSPECTIVES AND EQUAL TO SHARE OF ALL SALES
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES ACCORDING TO IQVIA’S DEFINITIONS.

Finally, many of the firms that are now pure generic started out with a large
portion of their business from brand sales. Thus, Figure 10 shows that Mylan
shifted from a mixed business to a nearly pure generic business. By contrast, Dr.
Reddy and Alvogen began our time period as nearly pure brand firms and then
shifted towards becoming pure generic over a short period of time.
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FIGURE 10. TOTAL GENERIC SHARE OVER TIME FOR SELECT PURE GENERICS
FIRMS
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In short, in recent years, the generics industry has separated into companies
that are “pure” generics, those that obtain most of their revenues from the sale
of brand-name drugs, and those with a “mixed” business model.
D. ACTING LIKE BRANDS
The separation of companies that have had significant generics businesses
into different categories reveals a group of mixed firms that now clearly plays
both sides. Supporting this conclusion is the observation that firms in this
category have behaved like brand companies when they have a branded product
that faces generic competition. Seeking to forestall the price reductions that
follow generic entry, mixed firms have engaged in an array of conduct to delay
generic competition as long as possible. And even companies widely known as
“generics” are pursuing this path, playing both sides of the brand/generic divide
when it benefits them to do so. In addition to Mylan’s behavior related to the
EpiPen discussed in the introduction,52 Teva and Allergan offer two other
examples.

52. For additional detail on Mylan’s conduct, including its use of settlements, questionable citizen
petitions, and exclusive contracts with schools, see Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold EpiPen
Story: How Mylan Hiked Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 53, 53–55 (2017).
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Though Teva is well-known as a generic company, its conduct in
protecting its multiple-sclerosis-treating drug Copaxone more closely resembles
that of a brand firm. To protect its $3-billion-per-year drug, Teva filed citizen
petitions seeking to delay generic versions. Citizen petitions are supposed to
ensure that the FDA is made aware of information related to a drug’s safety,53
but Teva used the procedure to stave off generic competition for Copaxone. It
filed eight petitions against generics, 54 with two of these running more than 130
pages in length.55 In each of the eight petitions, Teva argued that the FDA should
refuse to approve a generic version of its drug because the drug was highly
complex, and therefore no generic could produce the same active ingredient.56
The FDA denied each of the eight petitions, with the final denial coming on the
same day the agency approved rival Sandoz’s generic application.57 It is hard to

53. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.25, 10.30 (2019). But see Carrier & Minniti, supra note 12, at 333 (finding that FDA
denied 92% of petitions filed against pending generics between 2011 and 2015). For a discussion of
anticompetitive abuse of citizen petitions, see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.1 (3d ed. 2017).
54. See, e.g., TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001, CITIZEN PETITION
REQUESTING THAT FDA CONSIDER NEW SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION AND REFRAIN FROM APPROVING ANY
ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION REFERENCING COPAXONE® (GLATIRAMER ACETATE INJECTION) UNTIL
CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P1050-0001; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2014-P-0933-0001, CITIZEN PETITION REQUESTING
THAT FDA REFRAIN FROM APPROVING ANY ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION REFERENCING COPAXONE®
(GLATIRAMER ACETATE INJECTION) UNTIL CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET (July 2, 2014),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-0933-0001; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO.
FDA-2013-P-1641-0001, CITIZEN PETITION REQUESTING THAT FDA REFRAIN FROM APPROVING ANY
ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION REFERENCING COPAXONE® (GLATIRAMER ACETATE INJECTION) UNTIL
CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-16410001; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2013-P-1128-0001, CITIZEN PETITION REQUESTING THAT
FDA REFRAIN FROM APPROVING ANY ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION REFERENCING COPAXONE®
(GLATIRAMER ACETATE INJECTION) UNTIL CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET (Sept. 12, 2013),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-1128-0001; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO.
FDA-2012-P-0555-0001, CITIZEN PETITION REQUESTING THAT FDA REFRAIN FROM APPROVING ANY
ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION REFERENCING COPAXONE® (GLATIRAMER ACETATE INJECTION) UNTIL
CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET (June 4, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2012-P-05550001; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2010-P-0642-0001, CITIZEN PETITION REQUESTING THAT
FDA REFRAIN FROM APPROVING ANY ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION REFERENCING COPAXONE®
(GLATIRAMER ACETATE INJECTION) UNTIL CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET (Dec. 10, 2010),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2010-P-0642-0001; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO.
FDA-2009-P-0555-0001, CITIZEN PETITION REQUESTING THAT FDA REFRAIN FROM APPROVING ANY
ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION REFERENCING COPAXONE® (GLATIRAMER ACETATE INJECTION) UNTIL
CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2009-P0555-0001; TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2008-P-0529-0001 (SEPT. 26, 2008),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2008-P-0529-0001.
55. See TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001, supra note 54 (133 pages);
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2014-P-0933-0001, supra note 54 (132 pages).
56. TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001, supra note 54, at 2–4 (asserting
that the complexity of Copaxone includes unknown characteristics that are related to its safety and efficacy, so
a generic could not contain the same active ingredient).
57. Compare Drugs@FDA: GLATOPA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scri
pts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo=090218 (showing Sandoz-sponsored ANDA
090218, the only approved generic referencing COPAXONE, approved on April 16, 2015) with TEVA
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see this behavior as anything other than a delaying tactic—something generics
complain about when it happens to them.
The second example involved another mixed firm, Allergan, which filed
three repetitive citizen petitions seeking to delay generic entry on its dry-eyedisease-treating Restasis drug.58 The FDA denied the second petition by stating
that Allergan “should not be surprised” by its response,59 and denied the third
by explaining that the petition “repeats many of the assertions” central to the
earlier petitions that it had already addressed.60 Nor was that all. Allergan sought
to avoid “inter partes review”61 of its patents at the Patent Office by transferring
patents to a Native American tribe to exploit tribal immunity.62 Not only did this
maneuver fail,63 but it also garnered widespread criticism,64 even in an area
known for—as FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb has lamented—brand-firm
“shenanigans.”65
Mylan, Teva, and Allergan may have significant generic shares. But the
behavior they have engaged in when exploiting their branded drugs looks more
like what we have seen from brand companies. Perhaps this just reflects the
simple fact that companies want to win their cases, no matter which side they
are on. But it may also reflect a more general concern. As we explore in the next
Subpart, companies in the industry may have different incentives in litigation,
settlement, and acquisitions based on their mix of brand and generic drugs.

PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES, NO. FDA-2015-P-1050-0001, supra note 54, at 2–4 (arguing that no generic
drug could mimic the brand-name drug’s effectiveness).
58. ALLERGAN,
INC.,
NO.
FDA-2017-P-4745-0001
(Aug.
4,
2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-P-4745-0001; ALLERGAN, INC., NO. FDA-2015-P-00650001 (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-0065-0001; ALLERGAN, INC.,
NO. FDA-2014-P-0304-0001 (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-P-03040001.
59. FDA RESPONSE TO ALLERGAN, INC., NO. FDA-2015-P-0065 AND FDA-2015-P-1404-001, at 22 (Feb.
10, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2015-P-1404-0007.
60. FDA RESPONSE TO ALLERGAN, INC., NO. FDA-2017-P-4745-0001, at 4 (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-P-4745-0026.
61. Inter partes review provides a means to challenge patent claims before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board on the grounds that the patent is not novel or nonobvious. Inter Partes Review, U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE (last modified May 9, 2019, 10:15 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-applicationprocess/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review.
62. After the transfer, a district court (in a decision later upheld) found that the alleged infringers “proved
by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims of the Restasis patents are invalid for obviousness.”
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4803941, at *65 (E.D. Tex. Oct.
16, 2017), aff’d, 742 F. App’x 511 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 13, 2018).
63. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
64. Meg Tirrell, Allergan Responds to Mounting Criticism of Mohawk Patent Deal, CNBC (Oct. 3, 2017,
9:45 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/03/allergan-responds-to-mounting-criticism-of-mohawk-patentdeal.html.
65. Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Remarks at the FTC Workshop Understanding
Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Entry and Supply Chain Dynamics (Nov. 8, 2017) (transcript
available at https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucm584195.htm).
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LITIGATION, SETTLEMENT, AND VICTORY

In the remainder of our analysis, we investigate whether hybrid firms
compete as aggressively on the generic side of the market as pure generic firms.
We limit our analysis to nine pure generic and six hybrid generic firms in our
dataset that were drug patent challengers in more than a handful of lawsuits
between 2009 and the second quarter of 2017.66 The firms we include in this
more detailed study are listed in Table 1, along with the number of ANDA
lawsuits in which they were an alleged infringer, their generic share at the
beginning and end of the series, their generic sales at the end of the series, and
whether we group the firm as a “mixed” or “pure generic” firm. Except for
IQVIA’s proprietary sales information, we have published the data we utilize in
this detailed study, including per firm quarterly generic share and litigation
data.67
We consider a number of ways that playing both sides might affect a
company’s incentives to challenge pharmaceutical patents. We compare the
mixed versus the pure group’s litigation rate, settlement rate, and win rate.
Further, for each of these categories of activity, we consider whether changes in
generic share or sales over time, regardless of group, affect firm-level
aggressiveness in the generics market. Finally, we investigate the impact of
major acquisitions of generic firms on the combined firms’ competition in the
generics market.

66. The 21 firms excluded from this analysis fall into one of two categories: pure brand firms that rarely
or never enter on the generic side of the market, and generic firms that specialize in authorized generics and do
not enter without a deal with a patent-holding brand firm. We choose 2009 as the starting point of our litigation
analysis because it is the earliest year that Lex Machina has comprehensively identified ANDA lawsuits.
67. Our data is available for download at http://npe.law.stanford.edu/pharma/playing_both_sides.
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TABLE 1. FIRMS INVOLVED IN ANDA LAWSUITS AS ALLEGED INFRINGERS

ANDA
Suits
20092017
383
239
215

Share
All
ANDA
Suits
20092017
0.127
0.079
0.071

Total
Generic
Share
Q1
2009
28%
80%
29%

Total
Generic
Share
Q1
2017
34%
70%
34%

Total
Generic
Sales
Q1
2017
($B)
1.07
3.11
1.63

Group
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

144
62
48

0.048
0.021
0.016

82%
13%
83%

90%
20%
80%

1.37
1.17
0.36

Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

Mylan
Apotex
Lupin
Amneal
Dr. Reddy
Aurobindo
Perrigo
Alvogen
West
Ward

332
201
183
120
118
98
64
28
28

0.11
0.067
0.061
0.04
0.039
0.032
0.021
0.009
0.009

84%
100%
82%
100%
89%
100%
56%
62%
98.6%

96%
98.6%
95%
100%
99.5%
100%
99.7%
99.9%
99.8%

2.07
0.35
0.54
0.37
0.41
0.23
0.28
0.42
0.40

Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure

15-Firm
Total

2263

0.75

National
Total

3016

1.00

Firm
Allergan
Teva
NovartisSandoz
Endo
Pfizer
Fresenius

*NOTE: QUARTERLY DATA FOR ANDA LITIGATION FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017. “ANDA SUITS 2009-2017”
FROM LEX MACHINA AND FOR IQVIA FIRM TOTALS INCLUDES ALL CASES WHERE THE FIRM WAS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER.

“TOTAL

GENERIC SALES”

(AND “TOTAL

GENERIC SHARE”) FROM

IQVIA

AND EQUAL TO SALES

(AND

SHARE) NOT

ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES (AND SHARE) ACCORDING TO THEIR DEFINITIONS.

1.

Importance of ANDA Litigation

First, we examined litigation—in particular, how often firms seeking to
enter the market with a generic version of a drug covered by a patent are sued or
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sue in ANDA litigation.68 Generic entrants typically find themselves on the
receiving end of a brand firm’s lawsuit. The reason is simple: generics increase
competition when they enter the market. The brand firm stands to lose a
significant share of the market when generics enter because it can no longer
exploit its monopoly position in the face of generics offering lower prices.69
The typical route of entry comes after the FDA approves a new drug
application (NDA)70 and lists the drug and any relevant patents in a publication
known as the Orange Book.71 The generic applicant, before entering the market,
must then provide one of four certifications for each patent listed in the Orange
Book relating to the relevant NDA.72 Paragraph I, II, and III challenges apply
where, respectively, there is no patent on the drug, the patent has expired, or the
generic agrees to wait until the patent expires. Each of these promises to
introduce generic competition, but not at the expense of patent rights.73
Of more interest is competition resulting from a “Paragraph IV”
certification, by which the generic claims that the patents covering a brand drug
are invalid or not infringed and seeks to enter before the patents expire.74
Invalidating patents is a public good because it opens markets that should never
have been off-limits.75 The drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act were so motivated
to encourage competition and patent challenges that they provided 180 days of

68. We define “ANDA litigation” to signify a brand company suing a generic firm for infringement under
the Hatch-Waxman Act after the generic firm files a “Paragraph IV” certification seeking to enter the market
before the expiration of the patent on the ground that the patent is invalid or is not infringed. 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2018).
69. See Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cder/ucm129385.htm
(last
modified Nov. 20, 2017) (noting that price falls to approximately 50% when 2 generics enter the market).
70. Companies also can enter the market through (1) “hybrid” 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) applications, which
contain reports of safety and effectiveness but also can include information from brand studies, and (2) “Section
viii” carve-outs, which allow a generic to enter when it does not seek approval of the use covered by the patent,
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
71. The technical name for the Orange Book is “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations.” OFF. OF GENERIC DRUG POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS
WITH
THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE
EVALUATIONS
iv
(39th
ed.
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf.
72. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
73. Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(III).
74. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
75. E.g., Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 115 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (offering
measures designed to “increase the likelihood that discoveries or inventions will not receive legal protection
where none is due”); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (finding that licensees have
standing to challenge patent validity or infringement without repudiating their licenses); United States v. Glaxo
Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 57 (1973) (emphasizing “public interest in free competition” in concluding that a
licensee in an antitrust suit “may attack the validity of the patent under which he is licensed even though he has
agreed not to do so in his license”); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50
(1971) (allowing alleged infringer to claim estoppel where patent was previously declared invalid); Lear, Inc. v.
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (stating that a patent “simply represents a legal conclusion reached by the
Patent Office. . . . [I]n an ex parte proceeding, without the aid of the arguments which could be advanced by
parties interested in proving patent invalidity.”).
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exclusivity—potentially “worth several hundred million dollars”76—to the first
generic to file a Paragraph IV certification and to enter before the patent
expires.77 ANDA lawsuits against generics for infringing the brand’s patent are
a consequence of the generic proposing to enter the market before the last patent
expires, conduct that is central to the regulatory regime.
2.

Share of Lawsuits

As a first measure of the intensity of generic competition, we compare the
litigation rates of the nine pure generic firms in our analysis with the six mixed
firms. Our hypothesis is that by playing both sides, mixed firms will tend to be
less aggressive and thus, as compared to pure generic firms, less frequently end
up as patent challengers in ANDA lawsuits. In Figure 11, however, we see that
mixed firms were consistently responsible for more lawsuits per firm than the
pure generic firms.
FIGURE 11. AVERAGE ANDA LAWSUITS AS INFRINGER PER FIRM—PURE
GENERIC VERSUS MIXED
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Pure Generic Firms

Mixed Firms

*NOTE: “QUARTERLY DATA FOR ANDA LITIGATION FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 FROM LEX MACHINA.
“PURE GENERIC” CALCULATED BY COMBINING THE LITIGATION OF THE 9 “PURE” FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1. “MIXED”
CALCULATED BY COMBINING THE LITIGATION OF THE 6 “MIXED” FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1.

76. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 155 (2013).
77. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
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Looks can be deceiving, however. From Table 1, we see that our mixed
firms tend to be larger firms with higher generic sales than the pure generic firms
we study. Thus, there is a considerable size effect that obscures the contributions
of these firms to drug competition through ANDA litigation. In Figure 12, we
eliminate this effect by tracking average ANDA suits not only as infringer per
firm for each group, but also per billions of dollars of generic sales during the
quarter. Taking into account the size of a firm’s generics business, the picture
flips, with the pure generic firms now appearing far more litigious over time.
Thus, accounting for firm size, the pure generic companies have consistently
brought more ANDA challenges per generic revenue dollar than the mixed
firms.78
FIGURE 12. AVERAGE ANDA LAWSUITS AS INFRINGER PER FIRM PER $BILLION
TOTAL GENERIC SALES—PURE GENERIC VERSUS MIXED
25
20
15
10
5
0

Pure Generic Firms

Mixed Firms

*NOTE: “QUARTERLY DATA FOR ANDA LITIGATION FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 FROM LEX MACHINA.
“PURE GENERIC” CALCULATED BY COMBINING THE LITIGATION OF THE 9 “PURE” FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1. “MIXED”
CALCULATED BY COMBINING THE LITIGATION OF THE 6 “MIXED” FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1.

3.

Litigation and Generic Share

Turning from simple comparison of the two groups of firms, we next use
firm-level data and regression analysis to investigate whether differences in
generic share explain differences in litigation rates. Using our 15 firms and
quarterly ANDA lawsuit counts from 2009 through the second quarter of 2017,
we created as our dependent variable an average number of ANDA lawsuits filed

78. One possible explanation for this is that mixed firms gravitate towards larger generic markets. We do
not have the sales data by drug to test this hypothesis.
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where the firm was a patent challenger.79 Our primary independent variable of
interest is a backward-looking average total generic share.80
We control for average total generic sales. We also control for linear time
trends in litigation rates for each firm (“Quarterly Count”). Finally, in one
specification, we control for whether the firm is mixed, and in another we
include 14 firm dummy variables indicating whether a firm was a patent
challenger in the case.81
In Table 2, we see that except for specification 5, where we control for
firm-level effects, average generic share is a statistically significant predictor of
the average number of lawsuits filed with a firm as a patent challenger.82 The
same is true of average sales, but in the opposite direction. In other words, higher
generic share is associated with fewer lawsuits, while higher generic sales are
associated with more lawsuits.
The results in Table 2 are mixed and suggest that firms with higher generic
shares in the present also tend to be less litigious in the present. However, we
also find that pure generic firms and those with higher generic sales are more
litigious. While the negative effect of generic share on litigation conflicts with
our hypothesis that more generic firms will more aggressively compete, in
specification 4 we also control for whether the firm is a mixed firm. Consistent
with our hypothesis, we find that mixed firms are significantly less litigious.
This is an indicator that movement towards a pure generic business model or
maintenance of a mixed model matters.

79. The average lawsuit count each quarter is the average of the number of lawsuits filed in that quarter
along with the following three quarters. We similarly measure all other average values except for generic shares
throughout the remaining analysis.
80. In contrast with all other averages, average generic share is backward looking and an average of the
generic share during the current quarter and the three preceding quarters. We use an earlier measure of generic
share because we assume that insofar as generic share and changes in generic share impact a firm’s competitive
behavior, there will be a lag in the effect as business decisions are made in the firm.
81. We omit Lupin to avoid multicollinearity, which occurs when one variable in a regression model can
be linearly predicted from the others. For an explanation of dummy variables and the problem of
multicollinearity, see Daniel B. Suits, Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations, 52 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
548, 548–51 (1957).
82. Thirteen of the fourteen firms have quarterly litigation rates that are significantly different than Lupin.
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TABLE 2. OLS REGRESSION OF QUARTERLY ANDA LAWSUITS AS INFRINGER
(2009–2017)

*NOTE: QUARTERLY DATA FOR ANDA LITIGATION FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH 1 OF THE 15
IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “AVEINFRINGE” EQUAL TO THE
NUMBER OF ANDA LAWSUITS FILED WITH THE FIRM AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER AVERAGED OVER THE CURRENT AND
PRIOR THREE QUARTERS. ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS INCLUDED IN PARENTHESIS. * P < .10; ** P < .05; AND *** P

<.01.

Additionally, while we find a negative relationship between generic share
and the number of lawsuits filed where a firm is a patent challenger, we do find
a weak positive correlation between the growth rates of these two variables.
Appendix Table A.3 reports a series of regressions replicating those in Table 2
but substituting growth variables for generic share and lawsuits. The results
suggest that a 1% increase in the growth of generic share during a quarter is
associated with about a 2% increase in the number of lawsuits involving a firm
as a patent challenger in the following quarter. However, this relationship is only
statistically significant in one specification and in the remainder significant to a
90% confidence level. While statistically weak, these results do provide some
support for the idea that firms becoming more generic increase their rate of
challenging patents.
4.

Settlement

Most patent lawsuits settle.83 One simple reason is that litigants may prefer
the certainty of settlement to uncertain litigation outcomes.84 In the context of
ANDA litigation, however, settlements often indicate less aggressive
83. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677,
680 (2011); Shawn P. Miller et al., Who’s Suing Us? Decoding Patent Plaintiffs Since 2000 with the Stanford
NPE Litigation Dataset, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 235, 267 tbl.7 (2018) (finding that among patent lawsuits filed
in 2014, 72% had settled by February 2016).
84. E.g., In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., No. 243713-MD-2437, 2015 WL 5000954, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 20, 2015).
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competition by firms seeking to enter the market as a generic seller. In fact, some
ANDA settlements are anticompetitive because they include agreements to
delay entry in exchange for payments.85 Recognizing this possibility, in 2013,
the Supreme Court in F.T.C. v. Actavis held that “reverse payment”86 settlements
are not immune from antitrust liability and suggested reasons to believe they are
anticompetitive.87
In Table 3, we report the number of settlements and settlement rates for
each of the 15 firms we analyze as well as for the two groups of firms—mixed
and pure generic. Notably, the average settlement rate of the six mixed firms is
within one percentage point of that of the nine pure generic firms. While we did
see differences between the groups on litigation rates, the two groups have
nearly identical settlement rates.

85. E.g., F.T.C. v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013); King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 397 (3d Cir. 2015); 1 HOVENKAMP, supra note 53, at § 16.01.A; Michael A.
Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37,
39–40 (2009); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design
Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1568–70 (2006); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 U. MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1721 (2003).
86. The settlements are called this because the consideration flows from patentee to alleged infringer,
unlike typical settlements in which alleged infringers pay patentees.
87. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 141.
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TABLE 3. SETTLEMENTS AND SETTLEMENT RATES (2009–2017)
Number of
Settlements
211/269
124/154
125 / 161
93 / 112
29 / 38
30/35

Settlement
Rate
78.4%
80.5%
77.6%
83.0%
76.3%
85.7%

6 Mixed Firms

612/769

79.6%

Mylan
Apotex
Lupin
Amneal
Dr Reddy
Aurobindo
Perrigo
Alvogen
West Ward

193/238
108/138
114/133
64/84
63/78
61/73
48/54
16/23
14/16

81.1%
78.2%
85.7%
76.2%
80.8%
83.6%
88.9%
69.6%
87.5%

9 Pure Firms

681/837

81.4%

Firm
Allergan
Teva
Novartis-Sandoz
Endo
Pfizer
Fresenius

Group
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure

*NOTE: POPULATION OF 1606 ANDA LAWSUITS FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH AT LEAST 1 OF
THE 15 IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. “SETTLEMENT” DEFINED AS LAWSUIT
ENDING IN EITHER “LIKELY SETTLEMENT” OR “CONSENT JUDGMENT: CLAIMANT WIN” ACCORDING TO LEX

MACHINA’S CASE-RESOLUTION DEFINITIONS.

To test whether the firms in our analysis differ in their propensity to settle
depending on recent changes in their business mix, we ran a series of probit
regressions investigating the drivers of settlement.88 Our most interesting results
are in Table 4, below. In specifications 1 through 4, our primary independent
variable is a one-quarter lag in the growth of a firm’s average total generic
share,89 and in specifications 5 through 8, we substitute growth in average brand
88. Probit regression is used to model dichotomous or binary outcome variables. In the probit model, the
inverse standard normal distribution of the probability is modeled as a linear combination of the predictors.
Probit Regression: Stata Data Analysis Examples, UCLA INST. FOR DIG. RESEARCH & EDUC.,
https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/dae/probit-regression/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020).
89. For a one-quarter lag, the value of the variable at t-1 is used for the observation in time, t. In other
words, we determine the impact of the growth in average brand sales in the previous quarter on the probability
that a case filed in this quarter eventually settles.
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sales. For both, we define growth as the change in value as compared with the
prior period so we can measure how much more or less likely the firm is to settle
given recent increases or decreases in total generic share or brand sales.
We control for average brand sales and firm effects in all specifications.
To determine whether Actavis had an impact on pharmaceutical settlement rates,
we also controlled in all specifications for whether the lawsuit terminated after
Actavis was decided. In the regressions, we alternatively include one additional
control for total, average, or growth in average ANDA suits involving the entrant
as a patent challenger.
In specifications 1 through 4, we consistently find that entrants that had
growing total generic shares before the filing of ANDA lawsuits are significantly
less likely to settle those suits. Further, we find in specifications 5 through 8 that
firms litigating to enter as generics that had growing brand sales at the time of
the lawsuit were more likely to settle those suits.90 Both of these results support
the hypothesis that companies that see their future as generic firms are more
aggressive in seeking to enter markets and less willing to enter into settlements
resulting in delayed generic entry.91
While most of our controls do not significantly affect settlement, we find
that it matters whether the lawsuit was terminated after Actavis was decided. The
Actavis effect is modestly negative: cases terminated after the decision were
about 4% less likely to settle.92
To account for the statistical significance of the Actavis effect, Table A.4
reports eight regressions identical to those in Table 4, except that we substituted
our Quarterly Count time control for the Actavis control. In those regressions,
we see from the positive statistically significant impact of Quarterly Count on
settlement that over time, cases were more likely to settle. Thus, Actavis has cut
against the general trend towards more frequent settlement. Finally, we find that
both the growth in average total generic share and growth in average brand sales
are statistically significant in all specifications in Table A.4. This indicates a
robust relationship between these two variables and settlement. Thus, we
conclude that firms with a growing generic share are less likely to settle and
those with growing brand sales are more likely to settle.

90. Growth in average brand sales just misses statistical significance in specification 7 (p = 0.051).
91. Another factor that may affect aggressiveness is the number of same-day ANDA filers. If a generic
company must share 180-day exclusivity if it wins, it has less to gain from a successful challenge. Its win benefits
its generic competitors as well. Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 951–60 (2004) (discussing this problem as a reason why patent challenges are
undersupplied); Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885, 897 n.84
(2012).
92. That effect is statistically significant in specifications 1 through 4 and significant at a 90% confidence
level in specifications 5 through 8.

February 2020]

PLAYING BOTH SIDES

341

TABLE 4. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD AN ANDA SUIT SETTLES

*NOTE: SAMPLE OF 1217 ANDA LAWSUITS FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH 1 AND ONLY 1 OF THE 15
IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “SETTLEMENT” EQUAL TO “1”
IF THE CASE ENDED IN EITHER “LIKELY SETTLEMENT” OR “CONSENT JUDGMENT: CLAIMANT WIN” ACCORDING TO

LEX MACHINA’S CASE RESOLUTION DEFINITIONS AND EQUAL TO “0” OTHERWISE. MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED
WITH DISCRETE CHANGE OF DUMMY VARIABLES FROM 0 TO 1. ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS INCLUDED IN
PARENTHESIS. * P < .10; ** P < .05; AND *** P <.01.

5.

Win Rate

So far, we have found evidence that pure generic firms are more likely to
challenge patents in ANDA lawsuits and that firms moving towards a purer
generics business model are less likely to settle. We also find that when pure
generic firms litigate and do not settle, they are more likely to win. Table 5
reports the number of wins and win rates of each of the 15 firms in our litigation
analysis and the average win rates for the six mixed firms and the nine pure
firms. While there is significant variation within the two groups, the pure
generics firms are nearly fifteen percentage points more likely to win cases that
do not settle (55.8% versus 41.1%).
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TABLE 5. PATENT CHALLENGER WINS AND WIN RATES (2009–2017)
Number of
Wins ’09–’17
21/58
17/30
9/36
9/20
7/9
2/5

Win Rate
’09–’17
36.2
56.7
25
45
77.8
40

6 Mixed Firms

65/158

41.1%

Mylan
Apotex
Lupin
Amneal
Dr Reddy
Aurobindo
Perrigo
Alvogen
West Ward

23/45
17/30
11/19
8/20
11/15
6/12
2/6
7/7
2/2

51.1
56.7
57.9
40
73.3
50
33.3
100
100

9 Pure Firms

87/156

55.8%

Firm
Allergan
Teva
Novartis-Sandoz
Endo
Pfizer
Fresenius

Group
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed

Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure

*NOTE: POPULATION OF 314 ANDA LAWSUITS FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 DECIDED ON THE
MERITS (OR ENDING IN A CONSENT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE ALLEGED INFRINGER) WITH AT LEAST 1 OF THE

15 IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. “WIN” DEFINED AS THE LAWSUIT ENDING IN
EITHER A MERIT WIN OR A CONSENT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE ALLEGED INFRINGER ACCORDING TO LEX

MACHINA’S CASE RESOLUTION DEFINITIONS.

This relationship between generics focus and litigation success is also
present in firm-level business changes over time. Notably, in bivariate
analysis—which investigates the relationship between only two variables—a
10% increase in the average total generic share during the quarter a lawsuit was
filed is associated with a 4.6% greater chance of the challenging firm winning
the lawsuit (p = 0.001).
We also ran a series of regressions reported in Table 6 that investigate the
impact of total generic share on the probability of winning.93 In specification 1,
we control for a linear time trend in infringer wins. In specification 2, we

93. We define winning narrowly, including only lawsuits ending in a final merits decision favorable to one
side, according to Lex Machina data. On the complexities of defining patent wins, see John R. Allison et al.,
Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769 (2014).
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alternately control for whether the lawsuit terminated after Actavis. In the
remaining specifications, we include both time controls.
Interestingly, we find in specifications 1 and 2 that neither time control is
by itself a significant predictor of the probability the patent challenger wins.
Because both have significance at the 90% confidence level when combined,
these results weakly suggest that patent challengers won less frequently in the
wake of Actavis despite a general trend towards challengers winning more
frequently.
In specifications 4 through 7, we also control for whether the lawsuit was
a declaratory judgment action, as well as the total number of ANDA lawsuits in
which the entrant was a patent challenger. In specifications 5 through 7, we add
controls for average pure generic sales. Finally, we control for firm-level effects
of the two most litigious firms, Novartis-Sandoz and Allergan, in specifications
7 and 8.
In specifications 1 through 6, we find that higher total generic share is
associated with a significantly higher chance of winning a case decided on the
merits. We report those results in Table 6. However, we see that these effects
disappear when controlling for both an Allergan and a Novartis-Sandoz firm
effect in specification 7. The reason is that Novartis-Sandoz and Allergan have
much lower generic shares than every other firm in the analysis except Pfizer,
and both win cases on the merits less frequently.94 Neither firm control by itself
eliminates the significance of generic share.95 Given the small number of firms
in our analysis and fact that Allergan and Novartis-Sandoz individually
demonstrate the general finding, we believe the results in Table 6 show a strong
connection between generic share and entrants winning patent challenges on the
merits.

94. Novartis-Sandoz has a win rate of 25%, and Allergan has a win rate of 36%—both below the 41%
average win rate of the mixed firms. See supra Table 5. Further, Novartis-Sandoz and Allergan respectively
have 44% and 51% lower total generic shares than the other fourteen firms in the analysis.
95. In bivariate regressions of the probability of winning on average generic share and alternately either
Novartis-Sandoz or Allergan, average generic share is a statistically significant predictor of the patent challenger
winning (p = 0.006 and p = 0.014, respectively).
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TABLE 6. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD AN ANDA ALLEGED
INFRINGER WINS

*NOTE: SAMPLE OF 172 ANDA LAWSUITS FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH 1 AND ONLY 1 OF THE 15
IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “DWIN” EQUAL TO “1” IF THE
CASE ENDED IN EITHER A MERIT WIN OR A CONSENT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ALLEGED INFRINGER AND EQUAL TO “0” IF
THE CASE ENDED IN A MERIT WIN FOR THE PATENT HOLDER. MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED WITH DISCRETE CHANGE OF
DUMMY VARIABLES FROM 0 TO 1. ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS INCLUDED IN PARENTHESIS. * P < .10; ** P < .05; AND

*** P <.01.

To determine if there are other indications that more generic-focused firms
are more likely to win lawsuits, we ran three additional series of regressions. In
the first set, reported in specifications 1 through 4 in Table A.5, we simply
removed the Actavis time control. Our results are the same as in Table 6, except
that now the linear time trend is insignificant in all specifications. Average total
generic share remains statistically significant in all specifications except 4,
where we control for both Novartis-Sandoz and Allergan.
In the second set, reported in specifications 5 through 8 in Table A.5, we
removed the Actavis time control and also substituted average total generic share
for average generic share, which excludes IQVIA’s category of “branded
generic” sales. The results here are identical to those using average total generic
share, except that the coefficient on average generic share is smaller, indicating
that an increase in generic share excluding “branded generics” has a smaller
impact on the chance a firm wins a lawsuit decided on the merits.
Finally, we tested whether firms with higher average brand sales at the time
a suit is filed are more or less likely to win lawsuits decided on the merits. In
Table A.6, we see that, except when controlling for both Allergan and NovartisSandoz firm effects, firms with higher brand sales are significantly more likely
to lose their patent challenges decided on the merits. The magnitude of the effect
is quite small, with roughly $100 million more in brand sales associated with a
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1% decrease in the chance of winning the lawsuit. Nevertheless, the significance
of brand sales provides further support for the idea that mixed firms act more
“brand-like” and are thus less likely to win and fulfill the competition-inducing
role intended for generics.
The important result of more successful litigation applies when examined
from multiple measures of how “generic” a company is. This robust conclusion
highlights that the companies that are most “generic” are more likely to win
patent litigation. This has significant practical consequences. Most notably, it
can result in generics entering the market earlier than they would have if they
had lost or settled, which directly lowers prices for consumers.
F.

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

In addition to studying the connection between generic share and
competitive behavior in litigation, we analyzed the competitive effects of major
generic firm acquisitions. Specifically, we examined 9 of the 10 largest
acquisitions of generic companies between 1995 and 2016.96 We created four
dichotomous merger variables to measure the effect of the mergers as a group
on generic competition at various points in time during and after the merger.97
The first two merger variables capture sustained effects and the second two
capture effects focused around the time of the merger.

96. See Marc-Andre Gagnon & Karena D. Volesky, Merger Mania: Mergers and Acquisitions in the
Generic Drug Sector from 1995 to 2016, 13 GLOBAL HEALTH, at tbl.2 (Aug. 22, 2017)
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5567637/. We did not include Takeda’s acquisition of
Nycomed A/S in 2011 because Takeda is not one of the fifteen firms for which we collected ANDA data. The
nine acquisitions in our analysis are:
1) Teva acquisition of Barr Pharmaceuticals (Announced 7/18/2008 and completed 12/23/2008);
2) Teva acquisition of IVAX Corp (Announced 7/25/2005 and completed 1/26/2006);
3) Teva acquisition of Allergan’s generic drug business (Announced 7/27/2015 and completed
8/2/2016);
4) Pfizer acquisition of Hospira (Announced 2/5/2015 and completed 9/3/2015);
5) Endo acquisition of Par Pharmaceuticals (Announced 5/18/2015 and completed 9/28/2015);
6) Allergan acquisition of Actavis (Announced 4/25/2012 and completed 10/31/2012);
7) Novartis acquisition of Hexal (Announced 2/21/2005 and completed 6/7/2005);
8) Mylan acquisition of Merck Generics (Announced 5/12/2007 and completed 10/2/2007); and
9) Mylan acquisition of Abbott Laboratories’ developed markets branded generics pharmaceuticals
(Announced 7/14/2014 and completed 2/27/2015).
97. These variables are:
1) After Merger Announced—equal to “1” for the quarter the merger was announced through the
end of the time series and equal to “0” before the announcement;
2) After Merger Completed—equal to “1” for the quarter the merger was completed through the end
of the time series and equal to “0” before completion;
3) Within Two Years After Announced—equal to “1” for the quarter the merger was announced and
for the next seven quarters and equal to “0” for all other quarters; and
4) Within Two Years After Completed—equal to “1” for the quarter the merger was completed and
for the next seven quarters and equal to “0” for all other quarters.
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As Table 7 reveals, combined firms that acquired a generic competitor
brought more ANDA challenges than the prior total of the two companies that
merged. Their generic share also rose. Recall that the “firms” in our time series
data are constructs that in prior years aggregate the sales of separate companies
that would eventually merge before 2017. Thus, these results indicate that after
a firm with an existing generics business acquires another larger generic firm,
the resulting firm more aggressively litigates brand firm patents and also has a
higher generic share of sales than the two firms had before the merger.
TABLE 7. IMPACT OF TOP GENERIC FIRM MERGERS ON LITIGATION AND
GENERIC SHARE

*NOTE—QUARTERLY DATA FOR 1/1/2009 THROUGH 6/30/2017 FOR THE 6 IQVIA FIRMS INVOLVED IN A TOP-10
ACQUISITION BETWEEN 1995 AND 2016. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “AVE SUITS AS INFRINGER” IN OLS REGRESSIONS
EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF ANDA LAWSUITS FILED WITH THE FIRM AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER, AVERAGED OVER
THE CURRENT AND PRIOR THREE QUARTERS. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “AVE TOTAL GENERIC SHARE” IN OLS
REGRESSIONS EQUAL TO THE SHARE OF TOTAL SALES NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES ACCORDING TO

IQVIA’S DEFINITION, AVERAGED OVER THE CURRENT AND PRIOR THREE QUARTERS. ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS
INCLUDED IN PARENTHESIS. * P < .10; ** P < .05; AND *** P <.01.

How much have these mergers benefitted generic competition? The six
acquiring firms in our analysis were patent challengers in an average of 229
lawsuits per firm during the 34 quarters between 2009 and the second quarter of
2017, or 6.74 cases per firm, per quarter. Specification 4 in Table 7 reveals an
average effect per quarter during the first two years after completion of the
merger of approximately 0.9 additional cases per quarter or 7 cases over the twoyear period. This amounts to about 13% more litigation over this two-year
stretch than the average firm engaged in per quarter over the period we study.
In specification 6, we see that merger completion is associated with a 2.8%
increase in total generic share. The average total generic share over the period
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of our analysis for these six firms is 55.5%. These mergers are thus associated
with about a 5% increase in generic share for the combined firm over the average
for the two firms that merged. Both this and the estimate of the impact of merger
on litigation seem to be economically important effects.
One example of the phenomenon of the combined company becoming
more “generic” as a result of the merger is presented in Figure 13, which shows
that Watson’s acquisition of Actavis was followed by increased litigation and
sales shortly after the April 2012 announcement and October 2012 competition
of the acquisition.
FIGURE 13. ALLERGAN (INCLUDING WATSON AND ACTAVIS) ANDA
LITIGATION AND PURE GENERIC SALES
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*NOTE: QUARTERLY “AVE ANDA INFRINGER” EQUAL TO THE SUM OF ANDA LAWSUITS FILED WITH ANY ALLERGAN
FIRM LISTED IN APPENDIX TABLE A.2 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER, AVERAGED OVER THE CURRENT AND PRIOR THREE
QUARTERS. “AVE GENERIC SALES” EQUAL TO THE COMBINED ALLERGAN (INCLUDING ACTAVIS AND WATSON) SALES
ATTRIBUTABLE TO “GENERIC” SALES ACCORDING TO IQVIA’S DEFINITION, AVERAGED OVER THE CURRENT AND PRIOR
THREE QUARTERS. LINEAR TRENDS IN BOTH “AVE ANDA INFRINGER” AND “AVE GENERIC SALES” INCLUDED.

VERTICAL LINES INDICATED THE DATE WATSON’S ACQUISITION OF ACTAVIS WAS ANNOUNCED (4/25/2012) AND
COMPLETED (10/31/2012).

We emphasize that these are mergers among mixed and generic firms only.
Mergers among branded firms, or between mixed and branded firms that
increase their brand share, presumably would have the opposite effect.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
How pure a generic firm is affects how aggressively it pushes to enter
markets. That fact has implications for how we set antitrust policy. Society
benefits from more frequent, more aggressive, and more successful generic
challenges to weak pharmaceutical patents. Pharmaceutical companies have
significant regulatory incentives to assert weak patents and engage in other
forms of regulatory gaming to artificially extend their market exclusivity.98
Encouraging challenges to those patents is important. Once a generic has
brought a challenge, we want that challenge to be resolved on the merits and
lead to early generic entry if the patent is in fact invalid. Our findings suggest
two areas of improved antitrust analysis: settlements and mergers. And they lead
to insights on the U.S. adversary system.
A. SETTLEMENTS
For at least 20 years, brand firms paid generic companies to stay out of the
market once those generics had brought ANDA challenges.99 Many—including
the drafters of the Hatch-Waxman Act—have lamented how the patentchallenge procedure is not working as intended.100 Our findings are consistent
in highlighting how effective challenges require not just bringing ANDA
challenges, but seeing them through to completion.
We have shown that pure generic firms are more likely to take their
challenges to judgment and win when they do. That is important. And that was
a central purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Although we can’t prove causation,
there is a plausible mechanism for why pure generic firms fulfill their intended
role by litigating and winning. These companies benefit from changes in the law
that make it easier to challenge patents. In contrast, mixed firms might benefit
from those changes in the case before them, but such a benefit is more muted.
Indeed, because branded drugs are more lucrative than generic drugs, even a
firm that has more generic drugs than branded drugs may make most of its
money from the branded drugs. As a result, even if these firms would like to
make more money from generics, they will not do so if it makes their branded
98. E.g., F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013); New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis,
Inc., 787 F.3d 638, 642–43 (2d Cir. 2015); Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New
Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168 (2016); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and
Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687 (2009).
99. E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Charges Drug Manufacturers with Stifling Competition
in Two Prescription Drug Markets (Mar. 16, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2000/03/ftc-charges-drug-manufacturers-stifling-competition-two.
100. See 148 CONG. REC. S7566 (daily ed. July 30, 2002) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (finding pay-for-delay
settlements “appalling” and “conced[ing], as a drafter of the law, that we came up short in our draftsmanship”);
Motion and Brief of Representative Henry A. Waxman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, F.T.C. v.
Schering-Plough Corp., 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2005 WL 2462026, at *3 (noting that the agreements
were an “unfortunate, unintended consequence” of the Act that “turned the . . . legislation on [its] head”); see
also Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, 35, Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (No. 12-416) (stating, as Justice Scalia put it,
that “Hatch-Waxman made a mistake” and, as Justice Kagan lamented the Act’s “glitch” that once the first
generic filer “is bought off, nobody else has the incentive” to challenge patents).
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business—the real cash cow—more difficult. As one industry executive put it to
us, “If I am earning more on my patented products than on my generics, I will
consider defending my patents to be a higher priority than attacking yours.”101
This effect may be particularly pronounced for mixed companies like Allergan,
Pfizer, and Novartis-Sandoz that make most of their money from their brand
business.
Mixed firms might worry us for other reasons. As Scott Hemphill has
noted, pharmaceutical companies that engage in anticompetitive settlements of
patent lawsuits by paying generic competitors to stay out of the market have a
tendency to try to hide those payments, burying them in complex transactions or
disguising what is really a payment for delayed entry as an (inflated) payment
for something else.102 That tendency will only grow greater after Actavis makes
it harder to get away with explicit payments.103 Those complex, multi-product
deals are difficult to untangle because it is hard to know what each component
of the deal is really worth. That may make it harder to challenge complicated
anticompetitive deals on antitrust grounds.104
Mixed firms can sign more complex deals and therefore hide reverse
payments more easily. For example, the settling parties in Actavis itself tried to
pretend that a large payment for delay was really an effort to buy a generic’s
“help” in marketing a product that had been marketed for years without that
help.105 The FTC and the Court rightly rejected that claim as implausible. But
such an agreement is much less implausible if the company agreeing to comarket the drug is also a branded pharmaceutical firm with its own marketing
and distribution channels. Similarly, a mixed firm suing another mixed firm
could disguise a reverse payment by agreeing to settle disputes that go both
ways, leaving the agencies and plaintiffs unable to know for sure how much
money was actually changing hands and what it was for. Supporting pure
generics makes this sort of gamesmanship less likely and easier to detect. In fact,
pharmaceutical firms may even be buying potential competitors to shut them
down—so-called “killer acquisitions.”106
101. Email from anonymous source to Mark Lemley (May 1, 2019) (on file with author). During various
personal conversations between anonymous sources and Mark Lemley, this idea was echoed by a former head
of intellectual property at a mixed company—who was told by the business folks not to make arguments on the
generic side that could hurt the brand business—and a former lawyer at an outside firm representing a mixed
company—who was careful to coordinate arguments in the firm’s generic cases so that they wouldn’t interfere
with the more lucrative, brand-side cases.
102. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve
Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (2009); see also Michael A. Carrier, Pharmaceutical Antitrust
Complexity, 2 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2014, at 1, 12, https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2530169.
103. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158–59.
104. Hemphill, supra note 102, at 632; see also Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction
of Pay-for-Delay, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 249 (2019) (highlighting the complexity of settlements).
105. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156.
106. Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer & Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions (Sept. 12, 2018) (unpublished
Working Paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3241707. That coexists with acquisition
or in-licensing from startups as a pipeline for new drugs, as established pharmaceutical companies are

350

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:307

B. MERGERS
Our findings also have implications for merger policy.107 We should be
more welcoming of market changes that create purer generics and more skeptical
of market changes that dilute generics by mixing them with brand sales. That
may point in favor of allowing some mergers and challenging others, not always
in the obvious way.
How, for example, should the agencies analyze the merger of a pure brand
firm and a pure generic firm? It would seem like that would create a mixed firm,
which could have negative effects on patent challenges. But when a mixed firm
merges with a pure generic firm, the expected effects on challenges may depend
on the existing shares of the mixed firm and the relative size of the two firms. A
sufficiently large generic business may “pull” a mixed firm towards the generic
side and encourage more robust challenges by the merged firm. By contrast, a
sufficiently large brand business may push the merged generic firm in the
opposite direction. In settings in which the merging firms are at least potential
competitors, the antitrust authorities should consider not only the nature, but also
the relative size, of the merging firms in analyzing the effects on generic
challenges. Our data could also be used in predictive econometric models
employed in mergers, such as those used for unilateral effects analysis (in which
competition between previously rival products is eliminated, which could lead
to higher prices) and for analyzing the effects of partial ownership.108
There is precedent for such an examination in existing merger analysis.
Antitrust agencies considering mergers can take into account the involvement of
a “maverick” that “plays a disruptive role in the market to the benefit of
customers.”109 As the antitrust agencies have explained, mergers involving
mavericks “can involve the loss of actual or potential competition.”110 Along
similar lines, a company that “has often resisted otherwise prevailing industry
norms to cooperate on price setting or other terms of competition” can play a
vital role in bringing about competition.111
Pure generic firms can play a role in the competitive landscape similar to
mavericks. As our data show, they are more likely to challenge weak patents,
less likely to abandon those challenges, and more likely to win them. They are
therefore more likely to open up competition in markets that would otherwise be

increasingly relying on outside firms as a source for new drugs. Barak Richman, Will Mitchell, Elena Vidal &
Kevin Schulman, Pharmaceutical M&A Activity: Effects on Prices, Innovation, and Competition, 48 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 787, 791–92 (2017).
107. Scott Hemphill would bar complex deals altogether. See Hemphill, supra note 102, at 669. We think
that would be difficult to administer and could preclude some deals that enhance social welfare. But at a
minimum the law should take the opportunities it has to reduce the ability to enter into such deals.
108. In fact, even the D.C. Circuit in United States v. AT&T, Inc., though it ruled against the government,
accepted reliance on “Nash bargaining theory” (analyzing two-party bargaining situations) to predict mergerrelated price effects. 916 F.3d 1029, 1039–40 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
109. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1.5 (2010).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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locked up by invalid patents. Because of its importance, we believe the potential
to dilute the incentives of generic firms to pursue vigorous challenges should be
considered as a factor in evaluating mergers. For example, in applying this
analysis, the antitrust agencies could consider how “pure” the generic company
is and how vigorously it contested patents in the years before the merger.
Even if this factor does not end up being determinative in this setting, it
still can matter in crafting merger remedies. The antitrust agencies regularly
approve mergers subject to conditions, including divestiture of some or all of the
assets of one or both of the firms.112 The agencies could use that power to
preserve some pure generic markets by requiring the sale of certain drugs or
business units as a condition of merger approval. Such a remedy could be
particularly effective if two mixed firms merge, as divestiture could unlock
generic drugs from mixed firms that might not otherwise have strong incentives
to push them. And in doing so, it could ensure that the generic drugs find a home
in pure generic companies that have more robust incentives to vigorously serve
the purpose for which generics were intended.
C. ADVERSARIES
Finally, our study offers an interesting window into the adversary system.
Some, including one of the authors, have argued that companies with balanced
interests might set more reasonable policies than companies that know their
interests are all on one side.113 And that is true when the goal is to reach a shared
middle ground, as in a settlement or a neutral policy. But if the goal is to reach
the right outcome in court, strong adversaries do better than those with conflicted
interests.114 We think that is the right goal here, because the “middle ground”
between brand owners and generics is rarely a true middle. As the reversepayment settlements demonstrate, all too often it is an agreement to split the
profits made at the expense of consumers who aren’t at the bargaining table. Our
evidence suggests that parties with diverse interests are likely to fight harder to
prevail. That is consistent with literature that suggests that common share
ownership between brand owners and generics reduces the likelihood of generic
entry,115 and increases the likelihood of an anticompetitive reverse-payment
112. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC’S MERGER REMEDIES 2006–2012 (2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ftcs-merger-remedies-2006-2012-report-bureauscompetition-economics/p143100_ftc_merger_remedies_2006-2012.pdf (explaining a 1999 study on divestiture
and summaries of orders issued subsequent to the study).
113. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF.
L. REV. 1889 (2002) (offering an overview on standard-setting organizations, and concluding that some adversity
between parties is healthy to facilitate intellectual property policy); cf. Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard
Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Legal Advice and Its Regulation, 79
CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1991) (questioning the value of adversarial argument in the search for truth).
114. On how conflicted interests can affect business decision-making more generally, see Einer Elhauge,
Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016).
115. Melissa Newham, Jo Seldeslachts & Albert Banal-Estanol, Common Ownership and Market Entry:
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry 33–34 (Sept. 5, 2018) (unpublished discussion paper),
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.591375.de/dp1738.pdf.
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settlement.116 Where public policy encourages resolution of legal disputes, not
settlement, we want the parties to be true adversaries.
Those adversaries might come from unlikely places. If generic companies
cannot be relied upon to aggressively challenge patents because they have
conflicts of interest, we might permit or even encourage challenges from other
sources: consumer groups, public interest organizations, and even the muchreviled short-seller Kyle Bass.117 Federal Circuit standing doctrine will prevent
non-competitors from suing to invalidate patents, though it probably shouldn’t.
But they can bring inter partes review proceedings in the Patent Trial & Appeal
Board.118
CONCLUSION
The “generics” industry is not as monolithic as it seems, consisting of three
categories of companies that rely to varying degrees on branded drugs. Each of
these categories is doing quite well, notwithstanding protestations of doom
we’ve heard from all sides.
Which box a company is in affects its behavior. Mixed generic companies
that play both sides have mixed incentives. As those companies become more
brand-like, they are less likely to serve the competition-promoting function
intended by the Hatch-Waxman Act because they settle more patent challenge
cases, win fewer, and (controlling for firm size) challenge drug patents in fewer
lawsuits. Playing both sides presents significant concerns for competition policy.
The antitrust agencies should take market structure into account in
evaluating pharmaceutical mergers and patent settlements. In doing so, they
should encourage pure generics with the incentive to bring robust challenges to
drug patents. The payoff is clear, as these challenges would ensure that generic
companies play the role they were intended to: lowering high drug prices.

116. Jin Xie & Joseph Gerakos, Institutional Cross-Holdings and Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical
Industry 31 (The Chinese Univ. of H.K. and Tuck Sch. of Bus. at Dartmouth Coll., Working Paper No.
26503416,
2018),
http://abfer.org/media/abfer-events-2018/annual-conference/accounting/
AC18P5001_Institutional_Cross-holdings_and_Generic_Entry.pdf.
117. Jeffrey Kuo & Afia Naaz, Attack on Pharma Patents: Checking in on the Kyle Bass IPRs, POLSINELLI
(June 2, 2017), https://www.polsinellionpostgrant.com/blog/2017/6/2/attack-on-pharma-patents-checking-inon-the-kyle-bass-iprs.
118. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2018). Further, existing research shows that 8% of the patents challenged in inter
partes review from its beginning through January 2017 are pharmaceutical patents. Brian J. Love, Shawn Miller
& Shawn Ambwani, Determinants of Patent Quality: Evidence from Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 90 U.
COLO. L. REV. 67, 132 tbl.7 (2019). Future research should investigate whether pure or mixed generic firms have
been more aggressive and successful in bringing these challenges.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A.1. IQVIA FIRMS, TOTAL GENERIC SHARES, AND GROUP
Firm
Amgen
Boehringer Ingelheim
Gilead Sciences
Merck
GlaxoSmithKline
Astrazeneca
Celgene
Bristol-Myers Squibb
Astellas
Johnson & Johnson
Sanofi Aventis
Novo Nordisk
Takeda
Lilly
Hoffmann-La Roche
Abbvie
Pfizer
Novartis-Sandoz
Allergan
Valeant
Shire
Teva
Horizon
Fresenius
Endo
Lupin
Mylan
Mallinckrodt
Apotex
Prasco
Dr Reddy’s
Perrigo
Alvogen
West Ward
Amneal
Aurobindo

Total Generic Share Q1 1992
(or earliest available+)

Total Generic
Share Q2 2017

Group

1.38%
0.11%
0.00%+
7.47%
1.71%
8.69%
100.0%+
5.66%
25.1%
8.50%
24.2%
100.0%+
0.00%+
0.51%
2.16%
21.2%
8.43%
50.2%
36.1%
6.99%
40.1%
87.8%
0.00%
42.7%
16.0%
0.00%
40.9%
4.61%
0.00%+
0.00%
0.00%
6.39%
6.85%
68.2%
100.0%
100.0%+

0.00%
0.00%
0.12%
0.16%
0.21%
0.28%
0.83%
1.23%
2.44%
2.48%
3.18%
3.99%
4.05%
4.77%
5.40%
9.52%
18.7%
32.4%
35.3%
41.4%
47.0%
68.2%
71.7%
79.7%
89.1%
95.2%
95.6%
97.2%
98.4%
98.6%
99.7%
99.7%
99.8%
99.8%
100.0%
100.0%

Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Brand
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic
Generic

*NOTE: ”TOTAL GENERIC SHARE” EQUAL TO THE SHARE OF TOTAL SALES NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO BRANDED SALES
ACCORDING TO IQVIA’S DEFINITION. QUARTERLY SALES AND SHARE DATA AVAILABLE FROM Q1 1992 THROUGH Q2

2017 FOR MOST FIRMS EXCEPT THE FIRST QUARTER OF SALES IN IQVIA’S DATABASE IS Q3 1996 FOR GILEAD SCIENCES,
Q2 1997 FOR NOVO NORDISK, Q2 1995 FOR TAKEDA, Q4 1998 FOR CELGENE, Q1 1993 FOR APOTEX, AND Q1 2005 FOR
AUROBINDO.
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TABLE A.2. LIST OF ACQUIRED COMPANIES INCLUDED IN IQVIA FIRM
LAWSUIT TIME SERIES
IQVIA Firm
Allergan

Group
Mixed

Teva

Mixed

Novartis-Sandoz

Mixed

Endo

Mixed

Pfizer

Mixed

Fresenius

Mixed

Mylan

Pure

Apotex
Lupin

Pure
Pure

Amneal
Dr. Reddy
Aurobindo
Perrigo

Pure
Pure
Pure
Pure

Alvogen
West Ward

Pure
Pure

Acquired Firms
Actavis
Warner Chilcott
Watson Pharmaceuticals
Auspex Pharmaceuticals
Barr Pharmaceuticals
Cephalon, Inc.
IVAX Corporation
Novopharm
NuPathe Inc.
Eon Labs Inc.
Fougera Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Auxillium Pharmaceuticals, LLC
Indevus Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Paladin Labs Inc.
Par Pharmaceutical Companies Inc.
Anacor Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Hospira
Lederle Laboratories
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals
APP Pharmaceuticals
Dabur Pharma
Agila Specialties
Famy Care Ltd.
Matrix Laboratories
None
Gavis Pharmaceuticals
Novel Laboratories, Inc.
Interpharm Holdings
None
None
Agis Industries
Omega Pharmaceutical Inc.
Paddock Laboratories, Inc.
PBM Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Rosemont Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
Unico Pharmaceuticals
Lotus Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Bedford Laboratories

*NOTE: ACQUIRED FIRMS INCLUDE ALL COMPANIES THAT WERE BOTH ACQUIRED BY ONE OF THE FIFTEEN IQVIA FIRMS
AND THAT WERE ALLEGED INFRINGERS IN AT LEAST ONE ANDA LAWSUIT BETWEEN 2000 AND 2017.
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TABLE A.3. OLS REGRESSION OF GROWTH OF QUARTERLY ANDA LAWSUITS
AS INFRINGER (2009–2017)

*NOTE: QUARTERLY DATA FOR ANDA LITIGATION FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH 1 OF THE 15
IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “GINFRINGEAVE” EQUAL TO
THE ONE QUARTER CHANGE IN THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANDA LAWSUITS FILED WITH THE FIRM AS AN ALLEGED
INFRINGER. ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS INCLUDED IN PARENTHESIS. * P < .10; ** P < .05; AND *** P <.01.
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TABLE A.4. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD AN ANDA SUIT SETTLES

*NOTE: SAMPLE OF 1217 ANDA LAWSUITS FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH 1 AND ONLY 1 OF THE 15
IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “SETTLEMENT” EQUAL TO “1” IF
THE CASE ENDED IN EITHER “LIKELY SETTLEMENT” OR “CONSENT JUDGMENT: CLAIMANT WIN” ACCORDING TO LEX

MACHINA’S CASE RESOLUTION DEFINITIONS AND EQUAL TO “0” OTHERWISE. MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED WITH
DISCRETE CHANGE OF DUMMY VARIABLES FROM 0 TO 1. ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS INCLUDED IN PARENTHESIS. * P <

.10; ** P < .05; AND *** P <.01.
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TABLE A.5. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD AN ANDA ALLEGED
INFRINGER WINS

*NOTE: SAMPLE OF 172 ANDA LAWSUITS FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH 1 AND ONLY 1 OF THE 15
IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “DWIN” EQUAL TO “1” IF THE
CASE ENDED IN EITHER A MERIT WIN OR A CONSENT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF ALLEGED INFRINGER AND EQUAL TO “0” IF
THE CASE ENDED IN A MERIT WIN FOR THE PATENT HOLDER. MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED WITH DISCRETE CHANGE OF
DUMMY VARIABLES FROM 0 TO 1. ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS INCLUDED IN PARENTHESIS. * P < .10; ** P < .05; AND

*** P <.01.
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TABLE A.6. PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE LIKELIHOOD AN ANDA ALLEGED
INFRINGER WINS

*NOTE: SAMPLE OF 172 ANDA LAWSUITS FILED BETWEEN 1/1/2009 AND 6/30/2017 WITH 1 AND ONLY 1
OF THE 15 IQVIA FIRMS LISTED IN TABLE 1 AS AN ALLEGED INFRINGER. DEPENDENT VARIABLE “DWIN”
EQUAL TO “1” IF THE CASE ENDED IN EITHER A MERIT WIN OR A CONSENT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
ALLEGED INFRINGER AND EQUAL TO “0” IF THE CASE ENDED IN A MERIT WIN FOR THE PATENT HOLDER.
MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED WITH DISCRETE CHANGE OF DUMMY VARIABLES FROM 0 TO 1. ROBUST
STANDARD ERRORS INCLUDED IN PARENTHESIS. * P < .10; ** P < .05; AND *** P <.01.

